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# WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS


Week Ending 13 May 1972

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## SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS



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### Enemy Activity

The North Vietnamese made no further significant gains on the ground in South Vietnam during the week. The enemy continued his heavy attacks on An Loc in MR 3, but in much of the rest of the country he concentrated on resupplying and repositioning his forces for future assaults--perhaps husbanding his efforts for a flurry of activity designed to mark Ho Chi Minh's birthday (19 May), or President Nixon's visit to Moscow a few days later. At the same time, heavy Allied air action may have slowed down these enemy preparations. In MR 1, South Vietnamese forces mounted successful limited offensive actions which were designed to keep the enemy off balance and improve the fighting spirit of friendly One regiment of North Vietnam's 325th Division moved across the DMZ at the end of the week and it will probably be used, in conjunction with elements of the 304th, 308th, and 324B NVA Divisions, in any major thrust at Hue. In MR 2, one enemy assault against Kontum town was blunted and thrown back, but other heavy attacks appeared imminent. In MR's 3 and 4, there has been no substantial change in the tactical situation. An Loc still holds, but the enemy appears ready to continue the assault despite his heavy losses. In MR 4, the movement of at least part of the NVA 1st Division from Cambodia into the Delta and the establishment of a new command and control authority both suggest that the enemy may soon initiate heavier action in this area.

Enemy activity in Cambodia was light, this week, although two more rocket attacks were made on Phnom Penh on 9 and 11 May. There were no casualties and no damage. The only other significant actions occurred along Route 16 in Kampot Province, where government forces continued to withdraw northward toward Takeo under heavy pressure from elements of the enemy's Phuoc Long Front. The North Vietnamese now have complete control over a 60 kilometer stretch of Route 16, and this will facilitate the infiltration of both men and supplies into GVN MR 4.

Military activity was also light in Laos. Friendly forces have made some advances around Sam Thong, southwest of the Plaine des Jarres, in the wake of the return to North Vietnam of one enemy division headquarters and two subordinate regiments. There are many indications, however, that the NVA intends to fight for the Plaine this rainy season, rather than to follow the practice of the last three years and relinquish it without much resistance.

#### Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

The estimate of North Vietnamese infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia this dry season remains at some 114,200-116,200 as only three small, special purpose groups were accepted during the week. References to the movement of several unnumbered battalion-size groups near Vinh in North Vietnam, however, indicate that infiltration will continue into the rainy season. Our estimates on the numbers of NVA infiltrators in recent weeks, it should be noted, are considerably more spongy and subject to wider margins of error than they were previously. In part, this is because many replacement troops for the NVA divisions in northern MR 1 have come straight across the DMZ and have not been picked up in normal infiltration channels. In addition, there has been some recent degradation in our own ability to intercept enemy communications on infiltration.

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On the logistics front, the enemy is making a series of unprecedented moves in an effort to provide adequate support for the battlefield despite increasing weather, fuel, and food problems.

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than their traditional method of short-haul convoys with frequent transshipments. Moreover, they are pushing shipments through in daylight hours not only in Laos (from where Allied air interdiction assets have been diverted) but also in the high threat environment of South Vietnam itself.

#### Communist Political Developments

The U.S. decision to mine North Vietnam's ports and step up air attacks against overland transport routes in North Vietnam brought forth a predictable torrent of invective from Hanoi. The North Vietnamese also called upon their socialist allies for total support, but the initial responses from both the Soviet Union and China were notable for their moderation. Moscow has as yet given no indication that it is unwilling to go through with next week's summit meeting. For that matter, Hanoi itself has not yet mounted a media campaign critical of the impending presidential trip, similar to the one which it mounted on the occasion of the President's trip to Peking. Le Duc Tho has remarked publicly that the summit meeting is purely an internal Soviet affair, and it is possible that Hanoi has already resigned itself to the President's visit.

